Thomas Pircher ha scritto:
On Thursday 22 December 2005 15:07, Roberto A. Foglietta wrote:
is not safe to play with pointers which point directly to the process inherited environment space.
I would like to add my 2 cents: if security is important, then it would be better avoiding environment variables (and other information which can be influenced by a malicious and/or chuckleheaded user) at all.
I understand... ...so, for example, busybox has to avoid any enviroment managment to be secure?
Enviroments could be a data-input-channel like another and we have to treat it, not to drop it. Some sw has the need to r/w a $HOME/.myexec, for example
export HOME="$(cat malicios.data)"; myexec
now could happen:
- myexec: open a root shell - myexec: segmentation fault - myexec: quit with exit code 255
May be somebody could do a thing like this
cp -f malicios.data ~/.myexec
myexec < malicios.data
so we have to avoid file r/w and ignore keyboard inputs too, in order to enache security? :-)